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Decriminalizing Non-Appearance in 
Washington State:  
The Problem and Solutions for Washington’s Bail 
Jumping Statute and Court Nonappearance 
 
 
Aleksandrea E. Johnson
* 
Seattle University School of Law 
 
“The missed court appearance is used to coerce guilty pleas from 
individuals who otherwise wish to contest the underlying charges.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Gary Baxter missed one of his many court dates. Upon realizing that he 
missed this pretrial hearing, Mr. Baxter immediately called his assigned 
public defender. Like many individuals in this situation, Mr. Baxter and his 
public defender quickly addressed his failure to appear (FTA) by quashing 
the FTA warrant and scheduling a new court date. Unfortunately, this was 
not the first time Mr. Baxter failed to appear at one of his court dates. He 
missed court once before, due to struggles with his mental illness. Despite 
his efforts to rectify this mistake, the State gave Mr. Baxter a choice—plead 
guilty to the charge of felony harassment or go to trial with two additional 
charges of felony bail jumping—charges the prosecutor could easily prove. 
Mr. Baxter decided to exercise his constitutional rights and proceeded to 
trial. The jury found Mr. Baxter not guilty of harassment, but his relief was 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Hillary Behrman, Jason Schwarz, Magda Baker, Jaime Hawk, and the Washington 
Defender Association team for their support and feedback in connection with this article 
and the overall efforts to reform the charge of bail jumping. The author would also like to 
thank the many public defenders and criminal defense attorneys across the state who 
illuminated this issue and uplifted their client’s stories.
 
1 WDA Bail Jump Survey 7 (Oct 19, 2018) (unpublished informal survey) (on file with 
the Washington Defender Association and author).
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immediately shattered when the jury found him guilty of two counts of bail 
jumping. The judge then sentenced Mr. Baxter to five years in prison for 
failure to appear to his court hearings. Mr. Baxter’s incarceration resulted 
from the effects of his mental illness, coupled with an unfair prosecutorial 
tactic used to secure convictions. Had he not struggled with mental illness, 
Mr. Baxter would be free today.
2 
 
Criminal prosecution and punishment for failure to appear is a salient 
feature of the United States criminal legal system. Most people in the 
United States know that failing to attend criminal court proceedings will 
result in an arrest warrant and the possibility of bail revocation. Historically, 
the criminalization of nonappearance first appeared as a subset of contempt 
of authority.
3
 The 1960s invigorated a bail reform movement, finding that 
there were two systems of justice: one for the rich who could afford to pay 
bail and one for the poor.
4
 The bail reform movement gained steam with the 
founding of the Manhattan Bail Project, which conducted a study that found 
that defendants released on their own recognizance had a lower 
nonappearance rate than defendants being held under the traditional money 
bail system.
5
 By 1966, these studies lead to major revisions to the Federal 
Bail Reform Act of 1954 that favored personal recognizance release over 
the previous bail– forfeiture structure.
6 
 
 
 
2 See The Real World Impact of Criminalizing Failure to Appear 1-2 (Oct. 30, 2018) 
(unpublished policy materials) (on file with the Washington Defender Association and 
author). Author has removed all names and identifying information to ensure privacy . 
Story based on reported case to the Washington Defender Association. Used with 
permission from the Washington Defender Association.
  
3
 Daniel Bernal, Taking the Court to the People: Real World Solutions for Non-
Appearance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 553 (2017); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: 
Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L. J. 1435, 1455 (2009).  
4 Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventative Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices 
in the United States, England, Canada, and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT’L 
L. REV. 399, 407 (1996).
  
5
   Id. 
6 Id. at 407-408. 
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Despite these victories, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 also 
outlined penalties for failure to appear in federal prosecutions, though 
previously criminal punishment for missing court, or “jumping bail,” was 
rare and primarily occurred in contempt processes.
7
 The revisions to the 
Bail Reform Act outlined penalties for failure to appear in federal 
prosecutions.
8
 Under those revisions, those convicted of felonies would face 
a maximum five-year sentence and up to a $5,000 fine, and those convicted 
of misdemeanors would face year in jail and a fine equivalent to the 
underlying charge for failing to appear to court.
9
 Before the 1966 revisions, 
only seven states punished defendants for nonappearance.
10
 By the 1984 
Federal Bail Act, thirty-three states enacted similar provisions.
11
 Now, 
almost every state criminalizes nonappearance.
12 
 
Washington State is included in this history. The Washington State 
legislature first conceptualized the idea of bail jumping in the 1970s when it 
revised its criminal code.
13
 Washington State passed the first rendition of the 
bail jumping statute in 1975, then amended it in 1983, and again in 2001.
14
 
Criminally prosecuting people who “jump bail” is widely accepted, but 
ineffective in accomplishing its goal of deterring court nonappearance. In fact, 
data shows that while failure to appear convictions have risen, failure to appear 
rates have remained consistent.
15
 The underlying assumption for 
 
 
7  
8  
9 
 
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1455-56.  
Id.  
Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 1457; Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The ‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, THE APPEAL 
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/?fbclid=IwAR0Qarj 
Dh8F8XgoWSB-I5IZC2SSPVeMB8eOEHpjK33LKuH858Z6dNJGYMPU 
[https://perma.cc/2VUW-SYU9].
 
13 LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REV. WASH. CRIM. CODE, 329-331(1970). 
14 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1975), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1983), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.76.170 (2001).
  
15 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1458. 
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criminalizing the act of nonappearance is that the threat of a criminal 
penalty will encourage defendants to come to court.
16
 Bail jumping, 
however, is not the only penalty utilized when a defendant misses court. 
Upon failing to appear to a court proceeding, the judge can issue a FTA 
bench warrant which can lead to the defendant’s arrest.
17
 The defendant’s 
failure to appear can lead to many consequences, including jeopardizing a 
defendant’s ability for release on bail in the present case and in future cases, 
imposing fees such as warrant fees, and placing holds or suspending the 
defendant’s license.18 Missing from this conversation is why people miss 
court. People miss court for many reasons, such as lack of transportation, 
conflicting childcare duties, and the difficult choice between maintaining 
employment or going to court.
19
 Missing court is often unintentional and 
not a representation of the defendant’s view on the court’s authority.20 
 
While the United States is reconciling its practice of cash bail and its impact 
on mass incarceration, it must also examine bail jumping statutes that allow 
further prosecution and criminalization of low-income people and people of 
color. It is unduly punitive to criminally punish nonappearance with an 
additional criminal charge when a person’s bail conditions are already affected 
by the failure to appear. The bail jumping charge is not an effective way to deter 
nonappearance; rather, it unfairly pressures defendants to enter plea bargains.
21
 
It has been a tool utilized to secure convictions rather than justice.
22
 The 
Washington State legislature must decriminalize nonappearance by eliminating 
Washington’s bail jumping statute. 
 
 
16 LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 331. 
17 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(l)(1), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(c).  
18 WASH. REV. CODE 46.20.289 (2012); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); 12 ROYCE A. 
FERGUSON, JR.,WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 408 (3d ed. 2019).  
19 Alan Tomkins, Brian H. Bornstein, Mitchel Norman Herian, David I. Rosenbaum, & 
Elizabeth Neeley, An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to 
Appear in Court, 48 J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 96, 97 (2012)
  
20 Id.  
21 See infra Section IV. 
22 Id. 
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Defendants already face punitive action for court nonappearance as FTA 
warrants impact a judge’s decisions on bail imposition and revocation in the 
individual’s present and future cases.23 There are many changes that could 
reduce the unfair impact the bail jumping charge has on defendants, such as 
increasing the mental state requirements (mens rea) from knowingly to 
intentionally, reducing the charge to a misdemeanor, and allowing more 
defenses for defendants to fight the charge. However, eliminating the statute 
in its entirety best ensures the fair administration of justice, particularly for 
those most affected by the barriers to court appearance. 
 
In addition to repealing the bail jumping statute, Washington courts should 
reconsider the practice of mandatory court appearances, outside the necessary 
stages of arraignment and trial. Judges and defense attorneys can help alleviate 
the burden of many court appearances on those who often lack the resources to 
attend court, by inquiring more thoroughly about the defendant’s ability to 
attend court hearings and creating a more robust waiver of appearance practice. 
In addition, Washington should further invest in technology and community–
based resources that are shown to be more effective in improving court 
appearance rates.
24
 Integrating postcard and text–reminder and communication 
systems to remind defendants of their court dates, improving client–attorney 
communications, and creating more expansive options to reschedule court dates 
will help improve the efficiency of court dates and increase trust and confidence 
in the court system.
25
 By utilizing technology shown to dramatically improve 
court appearance rates, nonappearance based criminal punishment would no 
longer be necessary. Further investing in community resources, such as 
Outreach Courts and 
 
 
 
23 See infra Section V.C.1. 
24 See Jason Tashea, Text–Message Reminders are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce 
Pretrial Detention (July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/ 
article/text_messages_can_keep_people_out_of_jail [https://perma.cc/R7WP-VG8Z].
  
25 BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, ALAN J. TOMKINS, & ELIZABETH M. NEELEY, REDUCING 
COURTS’ FAILURE TO APPEAR RATE: A PROCEDURAL JUSTICE APPROACH 28 (2011).
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daycare facilities will help dismantle the barriers to court appearance 
without relying on punishment.
26 
 
II. ROADMAP 
 
Section III of this article will first define and distinguish the legal terms 
of art “bail jumping” and “failure to appear.” This portion of the article will 
describe how the two terms of art apply to the criminalization of 
nonappearance. Section IV of this article will examine who is affected by 
the criminalization of nonappearance and the varying reasons as to why 
nonappearance occurs. This examination frames the article’s solution—the 
call to abolish the Washington State bail jumping statute and to encourage 
court appearance in different, more effective ways. Additionally, this 
portion of the article will highlight how particular demographics play a role 
in nonappearance issues. 
 
Section V of this article will discuss the history of the Washington State bail 
jumping statute and describe how it is applied today. The article will further 
discuss what happens when a person misses court, how the statute works in 
practice, and the case law surrounding it. This portion of the article will 
highlight the implications of the bail jumping charge, including cost 
implications, the use of bail jumping in plea negotiations, the enhanced 
sentencing implications of a bail jumping conviction, and the collateral 
consequences of a bail jumping conviction or its use in coercing a guilty plea. 
 
After describing how the bail jumping statute works, Section VI will 
propose solutions to the problems described. This article will argue for 
abolishing Washington’s criminalization of nonappearance, propose a more 
robust judicial and defense practice of waivers of appearances to court 
appearances where the defendant’s presence is not actually necessary, and 
explore how innovative reminder systems and other community–based 
programs dismantle the barriers to appearing in court. Section VII of this 
 
 
26 See infra Section 0.0 and notes 267 & 272. 
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article will address the criticism’s proposals, including arguments for public 
safety, deterrence, and already-existing rules in place against prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. 
 
On March 18, 2020, Governor Jay Inslee signed Engrossed Substitute House 
Bill 2231 which significantly reforms the bail jumping statute. Section IX of 
this article will discuss the changes to the bail jumping statute. This article will 
conclude discussing further reforms to the new bail jumping statute and 
changes to decriminalize nonappearance in Washington State. 
 
III. DISTINGUISHING BAIL JUMPING AND FAILURE TO APPEAR 
 
The terms “bail jumping” and “failure to appear” are often used 
interchangeably, but are distinguishable legal terms of art. The term “bail 
jumping” refers to the criminal charge of failing to appear to court and 
 
generally includes that: 
 
[T]he defendant is released from custody or allowed to remain at 
liberty by court order, either upon bail or upon the defendant’s own 
recognizance, upon the condition that the defendant will subsequently 
appear personally at a designated date, time and place, which the 
defendant fails to do, either personally or voluntarily, within a specified 
period of time after such time.
27 
 
The term “failure to appear” refers to the defendant’s nonappearance, 
 
regardless of whether that person fled the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution 
or incarceration or missed court because of sickness, work conflict, lack of 
transportation, or other more common reasons.
28 
 
Failing to appear to court does not always result in the criminal charge of bail 
jumping for a variety of reasons. Bail jumping or failure to appear statutes vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and often limit bail jumping charges to specific 
underlying crimes. For example, the bail jumping statute might authorize the 
charge in felony and misdemeanor cases, but not in traffic 
 
 
27 8 C.J.S. Bail §136 (2018). 
28 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 677, 720 (2018). 
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cases.
29
 In addition, whether a person is charged often depends on the 
prosecutor’s discretion, policies, and practices. For example, the King 
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office states in its charging manual that 
“[b]ail jumping should not be ordinarily filed when the defendant turned 
themselves in within six weeks of missing court AND did not commit any 
new offenses while on FTA status.”30 
 
This article is about the consequences specific to the criminal charge “bail 
jumping” and criminal penalties related to nonappearance. The efficacy of FTA 
warrants, bail revocation, and pretrial condition consequences for failure to 
appear are outside the scope of this article. However, it will reference the issues 
of failure to appear consequences because of its overlap and the breadth of 
research on the issue of court nonappearance. There is limited research on 
failure to appear, and even less data on the charge of bail jumping because of 
the diversity between statutes and practices from state to state. Because of the 
overlapping issues and populations involved in court nonappearance, failure to 
appear research is an important part to understanding the implications of bail 
jumping charges and helps support solutions to prevent nonappearance, and thus 
the bail jump charge.
31 
 
IV. WHO MISSES COURT AND WHY 
 
The approach on bail jumping and failure to appear for the last thirty 
years assumed that nonappearance or “jumping bail” rested purely on the 
defendant’s choice.
32
 But people miss court for a variety of reasons having 
 
 
29
 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (2001); LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 
supra note 13, at 330-31. 
30 KING COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF. FILING AND DISPOSITION STANDARDS  
(2016) https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/prosecutor/documents/2016/fads-may-  
2016.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/3NQ5-BT8F].  
31 See Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, Elizabeth M. Neeley, Mitchel N Herian, &  
Joseph A. Hamm, Reducing Courts’ Failure–to–appear Rate by Written Reminders, 19 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 70, 70 (2013).
  
32 Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Economics of Bail Jumping, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 381, 382 
(1981).
 
 
 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Decriminalizing Non-Appearance 441 
 
 
nothing to do with deliberately disobeying the court. Understanding the 
make-up of who fails to appear to court and why they fail to appear to court 
helps innovate solutions for encouraging appearance through means other 
than criminalization. 
 
It is difficult to determine FTA rates due to varying definitions and 
measures among researchers.33 The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ report on 
Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts found that state court 
felony defendants had a failure to appear rate between twenty-one percent 
and twenty-four percent from 1990 to 2004.
34
 Prior research has shown that 
the national failure to appear rate has hovered around three percent and has 
stayed stable over time, despite rising conviction rates for failure to 
appear.
35
 State failure to appear rates may be higher than the national 
failure to appear rate, at times rates up to twenty-four percent.
36
 With a rate 
of pretrial nonappearance up to twenty-four percent, bail jumping has the 
ability to impact a large number of cases.  
Some defendants willfully fail to appear to court, but many fail to appear 
not only because they fear the consequences of the legal proceedings but 
also because they are unable to obtain reliable transportation, have other 
competing responsibilities (such as work, care for child or another person), 
or are disorganized, including forgetting appointments or losing critical 
information (e.g., citation, contact, or location).
37
 Factors associated with 
 
 
33 Bernal, supra note 3 at 554. 
34 Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 
214994, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, 8 (2007) 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB3R-SLK9].
  
35 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1459. 
36 Id. at 1460–61 (“One multi–city study sets the range as from 21 to 24% of released 
defendants. Another study of Lake County, Illinois reported that roughly 16% of released 
defendants under supervision failed to report for a court date, although that number 
fluctuated wildly – from as low as 5% in 1987 to a peak of 23% in 1995 and then back 
down to 14% in 2000.”).
  
37 Tomkins et al., supra note 19, at 97; see also David I. Rosenbaum, Nicole Hutsell, 
Alan J. Tomkins, Brian H. Bornstein, Mitchel N. Herian, and Elizabeth M. Neely, Court 
Date Reminder Postcards, 95 JUDICATURE 177, 178 (2012).
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failure to appear include gender, race, offense type, prior criminal history, living 
conditions, and employment.
38
 A study on assessing race and gender-specific 
predictors of failure to appear found that “indigence had a positive significant 
impact on [failure to appear] (i.e., indigent defendants were more likely to 
FTA)” affecting all racial and gender groups’ likelihood of failure to appear.
39
 
One reason for the high correlation of nonappearance and indigency could be a 
lack of access to reliable transportation, though general lack of economic 
resources may account for the behavior of nonappearance.
40
 In addition, those 
arrested for drug offenses had higher failure to appear rates.
41
 Those struggling 
with mental health disorders or addiction could have a higher failure to appear 
rate because their addiction may impair their decision-making or physical 
ability to attend their scheduled court hearings.
42 
Research also suggests that people of color tend to have higher failure to 
appear rates.
43
 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that young male Black 
and Hispanic defendants are more likely to be charged with failure to appear 
related criminal charges.
44
 The report found that 25% of Black and Hispanic 
defendants were charged with failure to appear compared to 19% of White 
defendants.
45
 This correlation could be related to structural barriers 
 
 
38 Haley R. Zettler & Robert G. Morris, An Exploratory Assessment of Race and 
Gender– Specific Predictors of Failure to Appear in Court Among Defendants Released 
via a Pretrial Services Agency, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 417, 418-419 (2015).
  
39 Id. at 426.  
40 Id.; see also Elisabeth Winston Lambert, A Way Out of the “Rotten Social 
Background” Stalemate: “Scarcity” and Stephen Morse’s Proposed Generic Partial 
Excuse, 21 UNIV. OF PA. J. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 298, 318-323 (2018) (explaining 
Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir’s theory of scarcity and how poverty impacts 
people’s behavior and cognition).
 
41 Brian Johnson, Christopher Kierkus & Christine Yalda, Who Skips? An Analysis of 
Bail Bond Failure to Appear, 9 J. APPLIED SEC. RES. 1, 12 (2014).
 
42 Id.  
43 Zettler & Morris, supra note 38, at 419 (In summarizing the current literature, this 
article states that previous studies have found that Black and Hispanic defendants were 
more likely to FTA than their White counterparts and that females may be more likely to 
FTA than males in particular jurisdictions).
  
44 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 34, at 8-9. 
45 Id. 
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associated with indigency and lack of trust and confidence in court 
institutions.
46
 Trust and confidence, procedural justice perceptions, and 
levels of cynicism are significantly correlated with court appearances.
47
 
This study found that “Whites had more dispositional trust than non-whites, 
and Blacks had less trust in the courts than Whites and Hispanics.”
48
 The 
various ways that the criminal legal system produces racial and class 
disparities and the lack of trust in the institution may explain the increased 
failure to appear charges against people of color.
49 
 
Stating that people miss court due to choice alone is hardly a convincing 
argument when many people targeted and affected by the criminal legal 
system are experiencing the symptoms of poverty, mental illness, addiction, 
or institutional racism.
50
 It is likely that statutes criminalizing failure to 
appear most affect those who fail to appear struggling with poverty, 
addiction, and institutional racism as all of these groups are highly 
represented in the criminal legal system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 See BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 25, at 28. 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 See id.; See also Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary 
Report on Race in Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 
636-37 (2012) (“there is substantial evidence to support the notion that racial inequities 
do permeate the criminal justice system” in Washington State, including in prosecutorial 
charging and sentencing recommendations).
 
50 See Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, supra note 49, at 636-37 (“… 
there is substantial evidence to support the notion that racial inequities do permeate the 
criminal justice system” in Washington state, including in prosecutorial charging and 
sentencing recommendations.); See also Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, 
and Related Intolerance: Regarding Disparities in the United States Criminal
  
Justice System, SENTENCING PROJECT (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ 
[https://perma.cc/5R8D-6JM8].  
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V. BAIL JUMPING IN WASHINGTON STATE 
 
To understand the consequences of the bail jumping statute in 
Washington State, it is necessary to first understand the statute’s legislative 
history, its policy purposes, and its day-today implementations. 
 
A. The History of the Bail Jumping Statute in Washington State 
 
Washington criminalizes a defendant’s nonappearance to court through RCW 
9A.76.170.
51
 The idea of criminalizing failure to appear in Washington State 
began in 1970 with two purposes: “(1) to give added legal incentives to 
defendants not to fail to appear for their trials, and (2) to construct a criminal 
law framework for wider use of releases on personal recognizance.”52 
Originally, the charge required that the failure to appear be intentional and 
 
 
51 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (2001). 
52 LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 330-31. The proposed 
framework of the bail jumping statute provided a bail jumping in the first degree and in 
the second degree as follows:
  
9A.76.140. Bail Jumping in the First Degree  
(1) A person is guilty of bail jumping in the first degree if, having been released from 
custody by court order with or without bail, upon condition that he will subsequently 
appear at a specified time and place in connection with a charge of having committed any 
felony, he intentionally fails without lawful excuse to appear at such time and place. 
(2) Bail jumping in the first degree is a third–degree felony.  
9A.76.150. Bail Jumping in the Second Degree  
(1) A person is guilty of bail jumping in the second degree if having been released or 
excused from custody with our without bail by court order, summons, or citation, upon 
condition that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place in connection 
with a charge of having committed any misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor, he 
intentionally fails without lawful excuse to appear at such time and place.  
(2) This section 9A.76.150 does not apply to a person released from custody that he will 
appear in connection with a charge of having committed a misdemeanor in violation of 
Title 46 of the Revised Code of Washington or in violation of any other traffic code: 
PROVIDED, that this subsection (2) does not apply to charges of negligent driving as 
defined by RCW 46.61.525.  
(3) Bail jumping in the second degree is:  
(a) A gross misdemeanor, if the defense is in connection with which the defendant fails 
to appear is a gross misdemeanor; 
(b) A misdemeanor, if the offense is in connection with which the defendant fails to 
appear is a misdemeanor. 
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that the failure to appear be “without lawful excuse” as a catch-all.53 Those 
developing the bail jumping framework believed that the bail jumping 
would provide greater incentives for defendants to appear for their trials 
than the current bail forfeiture system and saw it as an “adequate substitute 
for the money-bail system in instances where the court would prefer to use 
personal recognizance as a basis for release.”54 
 
In 1975, the Washington State legislature adopted bail jumping into its 
criminal code.
55
 The legislature adopted a different framework than the original 
proposal, though presumably with the same general purposes. The 1975 version 
of the bail jumping statute required that a defendant knowingly fail to appear 
without lawful excuse, unlike the intentional mental state in the proposed 
framework.
56
 This version shifted the burden of proof of “lawful excuse” on the 
defense.
57
 In contrast to its proposed framework, this rendition of bail jumping 
created a classification structure of bail jumping.
58 
 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 331.  
55 WASH.  REV.  CODE  §  9A.76.170  (1975),  amended  by  WASH.  REV.  CODE  § 
9A.76.170(1983):  
(1) Any person having been released by court order or admitted to bail with the 
requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state, and who 
knowingly fails without lawful excuse to appear as required is guilty of bail jumping. 
Unless otherwise established, the failure to appear when required shall be inferred to have 
been without lawful excuse. 
(2) Bail jumping is:  
(a) A Class A felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of murder in 
the first degree; 
(b) A Class B felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a class A 
felony; 
(c) A Class C felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a Class B 
felony; 
(d) A gross misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a 
Class C felony; 
(e) A misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a gross 
misdemeanor or misdemeanor. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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In 1983, however, the Washington Supreme Court found the 1975 version of 
the statute deficient because the legislature did not provide a definition of 
lawful excuse, thus holding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
59
 This 
decision prompted the state legislature to amend the statute. Rather than 
defining lawful excuse, the legislature omitted the lawful excuse framework 
entirely, leaving the mental state of knowingly intact.
60
 In 2001, the statute 
effective today, added failure to report to serve a sentence as a qualifying 
situation for bail jump and added the affirmative defense of uncontrollable 
circumstances.
61
 The 2001 amendment to bail jumping was passed with 
amendments to criminal statutes related to “escaping from custody,” perhaps 
indicating that its purpose is to target those who abscond from the 
administration of justice.62 Washington courts interpret that the statute’s 
purpose is “to compel appearances at criminal hearings” and “not intended to 
add or diminish the punishment associated with the underlying offense.”63 The 
meaning and intent of the bail jumping statute has evolved over time from its 
original intent to substitute a cash bail system and to target only those who 
intentionally fail to appear to a knowingly mental state and one affirmative 
defense of uncontrollable circumstances.
64 
 
B. Policy Implications 
 
As a policy, bail jumping is a process crime.
65
 Process crimes are 
offenses that interfere with the procedures and administration of justice and 
are generally secondary to an underlying crime.
66
 Process offenses combine 
notions of malum in se, or acts that are inherently immoral, and malum 
 
 
59 State v. Hilt, 662 P.2d 52, 53 (Wash. 1983). 
60 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1983), amended by WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 
(2001).
  
61 13A SETH A. FINE, WASH. PRAC. § 1806 (3d ed. 2019).  
62 Wash. S. B. Rep, H.B. 1227, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Session (2001). 
63 State v. Coucil, 210 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
64 LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 329-31.  
65 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1454-55. 
66 Id. at 1439-40. 
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prohibitum, or an act that is a crime only because it is against the law.
67
 
Thus, process crimes, such as bail jumping, aim to uphold society’s 
“collective interest in the integrity of the system of governance.”68 Though 
upholding the integrity of the administration of justice is a legitimate goal, 
the application of pretextual prosecution to punish offenders of process 
crimes distorts this legitimate goal.
69 
 
Pretextual prosecution refers to prosecutorial tactics that target defendants 
based on one crime but prosecute the defendant for another crime and are a 
direct result of prosecutorial charging discretion.
70
 There are a number of 
reasons why pretextual prosecutions are attached to process offenses, such as 
bail jumping. First, process offenses carry legitimacy, meaning that the public 
generally agrees that the process crime conduct should be outlawed.
71
 Second, 
process offenses usually carry significant sanctions, most commonly high 
sentencing ranges and stigma.
72
 Third, the government helps produce the 
evidence to prove the crime, such as the court record or the court clerk’s 
minutes.
73
 Fourth, the process crime is a secondary charge to an underlying 
crime.
74
 Finally and importantly, process crimes are easy to prove and very 
difficult to defend.
75
 One identified motivation for pretextual prosecutions is to 
secure convictions “against simply defiant or insubordinate individuals — not 
because their actions actually threaten the integrity of judicial processes, or 
because they are otherwise difficult to convict, but solely because their acts 
constitute an affront to the formal dignity or authority of the State.”76 
 
 
 
67
 Id. at 1441; Malum in se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Malum 
prohibitum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
68 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1441. 
69 Id. at 1441-42. 
70 Id. at 1442.  
71 Id. at 1443-44.  
72 Id. at 1444. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 1445.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1446. 
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Bail jumping, not only in Washington State but across the country, fits 
under all of the process crimes goals. Society wants defendants to appear in 
court. Bail jumping often carries significant sentencing ramifications for the 
defendant.77 Most often, the prosecution’s evidence to prove bail jumping is 
merely the court record, court clerk, or court documents.
78
 The State can 
only charge bail jumping against a defendant if they are “held for, charged 
with, or convicted” of a crime and is secondary to an underlying offense.79 
Based on the elements and evidence available, it is very easy for the 
prosecution to prove that a defendant knowingly failed to appear to court. 
Additionally, the affirmative defense of uncontrollable circumstances is 
difficult to prove and, often, unsuccessful in gaining acquittals.
80 
 
Bail jumping prosecution is wholly inconsistent with the reasons that 
people actually miss court and produce coercive and unjust results. As 
noted in Section IV of this article, many individuals miss court because of 
issues related to poverty, such as lack of transportation or child care, mental 
illness, or drug addiction.
81
 Further punitive measures for failure to appear 
increases distrust in the courts and does not proactively resolve why people 
miss court.
82 
 
C. How Bail Jumping Works 
 
It is important to understand how failure to appear and the bail jumping 
statute procedurally works in order to understand the implications of a bail 
jumping charge and conviction. This section will discuss what happens when an 
individual misses court, the elements of the bail jumping charge, the 
 
 
 
 
77 See infra Sections 0.0.0, 0.0.0. 
78 See State v. Hart, 381 P.3d 142, 147 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Boyd, 308 P.3d 
362, 370–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
 
79 WASH. REV. CODE. § 9A.76.170(3) (2001). 
80 See infra Section 0.0.0.  
81 See supra Section IV. 
82 Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 76. 
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affirmative defenses available to those charged, and the sentencing 
consequences upon conviction. 
 
1. What Happens When a Defendant Misses Court 
 
Understanding the procedure when a defendant misses a court date is 
pivotal in understanding the issues surrounding the bail jumping statute. A 
defendant’s presence is required at the arraignment, at every stage of the 
trial, at the imposition of sentence, and any other hearing the court deems 
necessary.
83
 At the preliminary appearance, the court will order the 
defendant’s release on personal recognizance, unless the court determines 
that release will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance or if it is 
shown that there is a likely danger that the defendant will pose a risk to 
commit a subsequent violent crime or intimidate witnesses.
84
 If there is a 
showing that there is a likely risk of failure to appear upon release, the court 
may place the defendant on pretrial supervision and set bail.
85
 The court 
will consider a number of circumstances when determining conditions of 
release that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.86 
 
 
 
 
83 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4. It is important to note that a defendant also has the 
constitutional right, through the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to be present at trial and at any stage of a criminal 
proceeding that is critical to the outcome if the defendant’s presence would contribute to the 
fairness of the procedure. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); see also Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). The author does not advocate that a court can proceed in the 
defendant’s absence at a critical hearing or trial in violation of these constitutional rights, 
rather, that the numerous pretrial case setting hearings may be onerous on defendants, 
particularly those with limited means and resources.
  
84 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a).  
85 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(b). 
86 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); 12 WASH. PRAC., Criminal Practice & Procedure 
§ 408 (3d ed. 2019), (The court considers circumstances including but not limited to: 
length and character of residence in the community, employment status, history, and 
financial conditions, family ties and relationships, reputation, character, and mental 
condition, history with the legal process, including prior instances of nonappearance, and 
prior criminal record, the nature of the charge, and past record of threatening victims or 
witnesses or interference with the administration of justice.).
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Upon missing a court proceeding where the defendant’s personal 
appearance is necessary, the court may order the defendant to appear by 
issuing a bench warrant, otherwise known as an FTA warrant.
87
 Once the 
defendant is apprehended, surrenders to law enforcement authorities, or 
appears on a quash docket, the court will hold a hearing to review the 
conditions of release and may revoke the defendant’s release and order 
forfeiture of the bond.
88
 If the failure to appear is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, the court may revoke the defendant’s release.89 
Alternatively, the court may decide to impose or maintain bail or amend the 
defendant’s conditions of release.
90
 Additionally, the court may punish a 
person for willful disobedience to the lawful process of mandate of a court 
through contempt procedures.
91
 Penalties for bail jumping do not dilute the 
court’s power to exercise contempt sanctions.92 
 
2. The Elements 
 
In addition to any court-imposed penalties for failure to appear, the State may 
prosecute the defendant for bail jumping.
93
 In order to convict a person of bail 
jumping, “The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
‘(1) was held for, charged with, or convicted of a particular crime; 
 
(2) was released by court order or admitted to bail with the requirement of 
subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as 
required.’”94 
First, the statute requires that a defendant be held for, charged with, or 
convicted of a particular underlying crime.
95
 The Court of Appeals held that 
  
87 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (l)(1), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4. 
88 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (k), WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(j)(2). 
89 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k)(2).  
90 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2 (j)(2).  
91 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. § 411 (3d ed. 2019). 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Hart, 381 P.3d at 146 (citing State v. Williams, 170 P.3d 30, 33 (Wash. 2007)). 
95 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3) (2001). 
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a person can be charged with bail jumping “while being simply held for a 
crime (i.e., prior to arraignment), while charged with a crime (i.e., following 
arraignment, but prior to trial), or while convicted of a crime (i.e., following 
trial).”
96
 Because of this holding, even if the underlying crime results in a 
dismissal or acquittal, the defendant can still be charged, prosecuted, and 
convicted of a bail jumping charge.
97
 Further, the classification of the bail 
jumping charge, in other words the level or class of felony or misdemeanor, 
is determined when the failure to appear occurs.
98
 Even if the underlying 
crime is reduced from a felony charge to a misdemeanor charge, the bail 
jumping classification stays the same.
99
 In State v. Williams, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the classification of the bail jumping 
charge is not an element of the crime and thus does not need to be included 
in the to-convict jury instruction.
100 
 
Second, the defendant must have been released either by court order, 
otherwise referred to as personal recognizance, or by posting bail with a 
requirement of subsequent personal appearance.
101
 Third, the person must 
knowingly fail to appear.
102
 In order to prove that the defendant had 
knowledge of the court date, the State must prove that the defendant had 
been given notice of the court date.
103 
 
 
 
96 Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1060. 
97 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3) (2001); State v. Downing, 93 P.3d 900, 903–04 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that this issue is sufficiently analogous to charges of escape, thus 
rejecting the argument that invalidity of the underlying conviction is a defense to the crime of 
bail jumping); see also Williams, 170 P.3d at 34, State v. Gonzalez–Lopez,
  
132 P.3d 1128, 1136 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming bail jumping conviction where 
the defendant was acquitted of the underlying offense). 
98 Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1060. 
99 Id. (“Under the statute’s plain language, the seriousness of an incident of bail jumping  
is determined by the status of the underlying offense at the time that the offender jumps 
bail.”).
  
100 Williams, 170 P.3d at 35. 
101 Hart, 381 P.3d at 146. 
102 Id. 
103 State v. Carver, 93 P.3d 947, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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The prosecution can prove the elements of bail jumping with a few pieces 
of evidence to show that the defendant knew of the requirement to appear 
for a court date. The prosecution can show this through a court transcript or 
through a signed setting slip by the defendant.
104
 The prosecution can also 
 
call the court clerk to testify to the defendant’s nonappearance, admit a 
clerk’s minute regarding the defendant’s absence, and the issuance of a 
bench warrant.
105 
 
3. Affirmative Defenses 
 
The bail jumping statute explicitly mentions the defense “uncontrollable 
circumstances.”106 The “uncontrollable circumstances” defense is defined as 
“an act of nature, such as a flood, earthquake, or fire, or a medical condition 
 
that requires immediate hospitalization or treatment, or an act of a human 
being such as an automobile accident or threats of death, forcible sexual 
attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future for which there is 
no time for a complaint to the authorities and no time or opportunity to 
resort to the courts.”
107
 The Washington pattern jury instructions describe 
the defense as follows: 
 
(1) Uncontrollable circumstances prevented the defendant from 
[personally appearing in court] [or] [failing to surrender for 
service of sentence]; and  
(2) The defendant did not contribute to the creation of such 
circumstance in reckless disregard of the requirement to 
[appear] [or][surrender]; and  
(3) The defendant [appeared] [or] [surrendered] as soon as such 
circumstances ceased to exist.
108
 
 
 
 
104 Boyd, 308 P.3d at 371. 
105 Hart, 381 P.3d at 145. 
106 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(2) (2001). 
107 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.101(4) (2013). 
108 11 WASH. PRAC., PATTERN JURY INST. CRIM. WPIC 19.17 (4th ed. 2016) (bracketed phrases in 
original).
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The defendant must prove this defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence.109 The “uncontrollable circumstances” defense supplements the 
common law defense of necessity, but is much narrower than the general 
necessity defense.110 In general, necessity “is available as a defense when 
the physical forces of nature or the pressure of circumstances cause the 
defendant to take unlawful action to avoid harm which social policy deems 
greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law.”111 While courts 
have not decided whether incarceration is an uncontrollable 
circumstance,
112
 it is possible courts will consider failure to appear due to 
incarceration as a defendant’s contribution to a creation of a circumstance in 
reckless disregard for the requirement to appear or surrender.
113 
 
As such, an “uncontrollable circumstances” defense is difficult to employ 
against an easily proved charge and does not acknowledge the many reasons 
why people miss court. For example, courts have rejected this defense when 
the defendant cannot show proof of hospitalization.
114
 Uncontrollable 
circumstances only contemplates serious events that obstruct a person’s 
ability to appear in court rather than the usual reasons such as sickness, lack 
of transportation, or childcare. 
 
Other defenses have been unsuccessful in the courts. For example, in 
State v. Carver, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s claim that he 
forgot about his court appearance was not a defense and the prosecutor did 
not commit prosecutorial misconduct by telling the jury during closing 
arguments that forgetfulness was not a defense.
115
 In addition, because 
principles of the necessity defense underlie the “uncontrollable 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id.; see also State v. White, 152 P.3d 354, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.76.101(4) (2013).
  
111 State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).  
112 See State v. O’Brien, 267 P.3d 422, 426 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
113 See Wash. S. B. Rep, H.B. 1227, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Session (2001); See also 11 WASH. PRAC., 
PATTERN JURY INST. CRIM. WPIC 19.17 (4th ed. 2016).
 
114 State v. Fredrick, 97 P.3d 47, 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  
115 Carver, 93 P.3d at 950.  
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circumstances” defense, a defendant is not entitled to the general necessity 
defense jury instructions.
116
 This conclusion is problematic because the 
courts have been unwilling to accept other defenses that acknowledge the 
many reasons why people miss court. Thus, the jury is unable to seriously 
consider evidence or arguments that address the reason the person missed 
court. 
 
4. Sentencing Consequences 
 
Bail jumping, like other process crimes, has serious sentencing 
implications.
117
 Washington utilizes a determinant sentencing grid for most 
felony crimes.
118
 The relevant portion of the sentencing grid is represented 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Bail Jump Classifications with the Relevant Adult Felony 
Sentencing Grid.
119 
  
Bail Jump SERIOUS  OFFENSE SCORE  
Classification LEVEL 
     
0 1 2 3 4 
       
Class A
120 VI 13m 18m 2y 2y 6m 3y 
  12+–14 15–20 21–27    26–34 31–41 
       
Class B
121 V 9m 13m 15m 18m 2y 2m 
  6–12 12+–14 13–17 15–20 22–29 
        
 
 
116 White, 152 P.3d at 365. 
117 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1444. 
118 DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS WASH. ST. (last visited Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.doc.wa.gov/corrections/justice/sentencing/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2DB3-EG45].
 
 
119 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510 (2018). 
120 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(a) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing 
that bail jumping is a class A felony when the underlying charge is murder in the first degree).
 
 
121 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(b) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing 
that bail jumping is a class B felony when the underlying charge is a class A felony that is not murder 
in the first degree).
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Class C
122 
III  
   
   
Bail Jump SERIOUS  
Classification LEVEL  
   
Class A VI  
   
Class B V  
   
Class C III  
 
 
 
2m 5m 8m 11m 14m 
1–3 3–8 4–12 9–12 12 
    +–16 
 OFFENSE SCORE  
5 6 7 8 9 or 
    more 
3y 6m 4y 6m 5y 5m 6y 6m 7y 6m 
36–48 46–61 57–75 67–89 77–102 
3y 2m 4y 5y 6y 7y 
33–43 41–54 51–68 62–82 72–96 
20m 2y 2m 3y 2m 4y 2m 5y 
17–22 22–29 33–43 43–57 51–68  
 
Table 1 shows the relevant part of the Washington felony sentencing grid 
with the matching bail jumping charge and serious level. 
 
Washington determines sentencing ranges based on the seriousness of the 
charge, categorized in “Serious Level,” and the defendant’s determined 
offense score.123 The judge calculates the defendant’s offense score by 
designating points for previous adult felonies, certain previous juvenile 
dispositions, current offenses, the defendant’s status at the time the offense 
was committed, and other statutory enhancements.
124
 The Washington 
Caseload Forecast Council publishes annual sentencing statistical 
summaries of adult felonies that reports the number and average sentences 
associated with all felonies, including bail jumping.
125 
 
 
122 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170(3)(c) (2001), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018) (providing 
that bail jumping is a class C felony when the underlying charge is a class B or C felony).
 
 
123 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.520 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2018); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94A.525 (2017).
 
124 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.525 (2017); see also WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST 
COUNCIL, WASH. ST. ADULT SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 293–295 (2017), 
https://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/SentencingManual/Adult_Sentencing_M 
anual_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN89-4V3J].  
125 WASH. ST. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, https://sgc.wa.gov/sentencing-guidelines-commission 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S492-6RL5]; WASH. ST.
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Chart 1. Annual Number of Class B Felony Bail Jumping Sentences
126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, https://www.cfc.wa.gov/default.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/PAC2-NA85]. 
126 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, CRIM. JUST. PUBLICATIONS (last visited  
Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cfc.wa.gov/Publications.htm [https://perma.cc/2LSA-P37P] (this 
chart is a compilation of all the reports filed under the Criminal Justice Publications); 
Aleksandrea Johnson, Compilation of the Washington State Caseload Forecast Statistical 
Summary of Adult Felony Sentencing Fiscal Years 1999-2019 Regarding Bail Jumping (Apr. 
18, 2020) (unpublished data compilation) (on file with author). 
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Chart 2. Annual Number of Class C Felony Bail Jumping Sentences
127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3. Class B Felony Bail Jumping Average Sentence Length
128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2. 
 
128 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2. 
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Chart 4. Class C Felony Bail Jumping Average Sentence Length
129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of the 24,257 felony sentences imposed in the 2019 fiscal year, there 
were four Class B felony bail jumping sentences imposed and 305 Class C 
felony bail jumping sentences imposed, as illustrated in Charts 1 and 2.
130
 The 
average sentence for the four class B felonies, as shown in Chart 3, was 41.3 
months in prison.
131
 Sentences for Class C felony bail jumping, as shown in 
Chart 4, included 124 prison sentences with an average of 29.8 months and 
 
226 non-prison sentences, including jail sentences, for 2.9 months.
132
 A 
review of all publications shows that there have been no convictions for a 
class A bail jumping felony.
133
 In misdemeanor bail jumping charges, the 
 
 
 
129 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126; Johnson, supra note 126, at 1-2. 
 
130 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, STAT. SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY 
SENT’G FISCAL YEAR 2019, vii, 14 (2019)  
https://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/StatisticalSummary/Adult_Stat_Sum_FY  
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM4V-8Y8C]. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 See WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 126. 
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maximum penalty is ninety days in jail and up to a $1,000 fine.
134
 Finally, 
and importantly, a judge can hold the person charged with bail jumping in 
jail pretrial as a consequence of their failure to appear.
135 
 
D. The Implications of a Bail Jumping Charge 
 
Bail jumping charges have many implications on the criminal legal 
system and the people charged. This section will discuss the consequences 
of a bail jumping charge and conviction, the effects on marginalized 
communities, and the way bail jumping impacts plea bargaining. 
 
1. Consequences of a Bail Jumping Charge and Conviction 
 
Failing to appear to court, and thereby obtaining an outstanding bench 
warrant, creates collateral consequences alone.
136
 In addition to amplifying 
collateral consequences, a bail jumping charge and conviction can have 
devastating effects on sentencing, perceptions on a person’s criminal 
history, and trust and confidence in the justice system.
137
 First, the 
defendant can face increased sentencing implications on top of any pretrial 
sanctions.
138
 It is also reasonable to expect that a person could be charged 
and convicted of bail jumping even if the judge declines to punish the 
defendant pretrial for their failure to appear.
139
 This naturally can lead to 
confusion and lack of trust in the justice system.
140 
 
 
134 SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF., CHARGING AND DISPOSITION 
STANDARDS 150 (2014) https://snohomishcountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/ 
16794/Charging-and-Disposition-Standards—2014 [https://perma.cc/8LUH-YUTG].  
135 See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k) (the court may revoke release and may order forfeiture of 
any bond if a violation to pretrial conditions is proved by clear and convincing evidence).
 
 
136 Gouldin, supra note 28, at 694-95 (Defendants with outstanding warrants for failure to appear can 
cause difficulty in securing legitimate and stable employment, obtaining and maintaining a driver’s 
license, obtaining public benefits, additional fines and fees.).
  
137 See supra Sections IV & V.C.4; see also infra Section V.D.2. 
138 See supra Section V.C.1 & Section V.C.4. 
139 See supra Section V.C.1. 
140 See supra Sections IV & V.D.2. 
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Further, the additional bail jumping felony or misdemeanor record on a 
person’s criminal history may affect their ability to obtain employment, 
housing, or other benefits. Bail jumping is often mistakenly perceived as a 
choice to deliberately disobey the court or avoid prosecution.
141
 An employer 
with this perception could misunderstand that the failure to appear was instead a 
result of sickness, lack of transportation, or some other legitimate excuse that 
would not legally excuse the bail jumping charge in court.
142 
 
In effect, bail jumping doubly punishes a person for failing to appear in 
court regardless of the reason. Because failure to appear encompasses both 
people who abscond from prosecution and incarceration and those who miss 
court due to lack of resources, organization, or competing obligations, a 
person’s record of bail jumping or failure to appear can cause further 
detention or punishment in future cases. For example, if someone misses 
their court appearance because they were hospitalized, a judge in a future 
prosecution will see the FTA on their record and take that into consideration 
to determine whether someone is a flight risk.
143
 Judges report that one of 
the most important factors in pretrial release consideration is the number of 
past FTAs.
144
 Defendants with even one FTA on their record could be 
denied release and bail, regardless of the reason why they failed to 
appear.
145
 In Washington, as well as many other states, if a person is 
charged with bail jumping, the judge will see both a FTA and a bail 
jumping record.
146
 This can lead to pretrial detention, or, if a person is 
released, more restrictive and expensive pretrial release conditions, such as 
travel restrictions or electronic monitoring.
147 
 
 
 
141 See infra Section 0.0.0. 
142 Myers, supra note 32, at 382. 
143 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c); Corey & Lo, supra note 12. 
144 Corey & Lo, supra note 12. 
145 Id. 
146 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(c). 
147 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(b), Corey & Lo, supra note 12. 
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Communities that have higher rates of failure to appear warrants, charges, or 
convictions, particularly including people who are indigent, those who suffer 
from mental illness or addiction, or communities of color, are 
disproportionately affected by these collateral consequences. Because of “the 
overpolicing of communities of color . . . people from those communities are 
likelier to have prior convictions or past FTAs, which lead to high scores on 
pretrial risk algorithms.”
148
 A bail jumping conviction coupled with previous 
FTAs, including the FTA that led to the bail jumping conviction, will be 
considered by the judge and possibly lead to further detention or pretrial 
restrictions that could hinder a person’s ability to assist in their own case, 
maintain employment, or provide for their family and community.
149 
 
A bail jumping conviction can also compromise a person’s immigration 
status. Under federal law, offenses relating to failure to appear for service of a 
sentence and to court is considered an aggravated felony.
150
 Aggravated 
felonies carry the most severe immigration consequences of any category of 
crime.
151
 Convictions of aggravated felonies prevent noncitizens from 
receiving relief that would spare them from deportation, including asylum, and 
from being readmitted to the United States in the future.
152
 The definition of 
“aggravated felony” does not require the crime to be “aggravated” or a 
 
 
 
148 Corey & Lo, supra note 12; see also, Madeleine Carlisle, The Bail–Reform Tool that Activists 
Want Abolished, ATLANTIC (Sep. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/the-bail-reform-tool-that-activists-want-
abolished/570913/ [https://perma.cc/43X3-G84G] (“The number of times someone has been 
convicted of a crime, for example, or their failure to appear in court could both be affected by racial 
bias.”).
  
149 See supra Section V.C.1. 
150 8 USC §1101(a)(43)(Q) (2014); 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(T) (2014). 
151 Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aggravated_felo nies.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZTV-RMJU].
  
152 Id.; see also Henriquez v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 70, 74 (2018) (finding that New York’s version of 
the bail jumping statute constituted an aggravated felony and affirming the immigration judge’s 
decision that Mr. Henriquez was ineligible for cancellation of removal).
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“felony” to qualify.
153
 Under immigration law, Congress determines what 
constitutes an aggravated felony.
154
 Today, “aggravated felonies” under 
immigration law include many nonviolent and minor offenses, such as 
failure to appear.
155 
 
The inclusion of bail jumping and failure to appear within the definition 
of “aggravated felony” in an immigration context poses significant 
problems for noncitizen individuals entangled in the criminal legal system 
by making them more vulnerable to the coercive effects of the charge and to 
removal and deportation proceedings, especially considering undocumented 
individuals’ fears of encountering Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) agents in courthouses.
156
 The threat of a bail jumping charge may 
thus force a noncitizen to enter into plea negotiations in an effort to avoid 
immigration consequences. Even worse, if the underlying charge is 
considered an aggravated felony and the noncitizen wishes to exercise their 
constitutional right to a trial, the noncitizen may face an additional bail 
jumping charge that is much more difficult to combat.
157
 Immigration 
consequences for a bail jumping conviction as an aggravated felony include 
deportation, removal proceedings, detention, and a loss of defenses and 
waivers to prevent removal.
158 
 
Bail jumping charges and convictions lead to unduly punitive and duplicative 
consequences, especially to the most vulnerable and marginalized 
communities.
159
 Despite the harsh consequences of a bail jumping conviction, 
formal charges and convictions are fairly rare.
160
 The much more 
 
 
153 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 151, at 1. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  
156 See Ctr. for Hum. Rts., Justice Compromised: Immigration Arrests at Washington State 
Courthouses, UNIV. OF WASH. (Oct. 16, 2019) https://jsis.washington.edu/ 
humanrights/2019/10/16/ice-cbp-courthouse-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/ZXT8-7TYN].
  
157 See discussion supra Section V.C.2. 
158 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 151, at 2-3. 
159 See discussion supra Section IV. 
160 See supra text and graphs accompanying notes 117-135. 
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common and nefarious use of the bail jumping statute is its effects on plea 
bargaining. 
 
2. Coercive Plea Bargaining 
 
Besides the collateral consequences to a bail jumping conviction, the 
biggest problem with bail jumping is its susceptibility to coercive plea 
bargaining. Not unlike the rest of the United States, the criminal legal 
system in Washington State is, for the most part, a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials.161 One key prosecutorial power is “the ability to control a 
defendant’s sentencing exposure by manipulating the charges against 
him.”
162
 Charge bargaining is essentially an agreement to “replace a higher 
charge with a lower one in exchange for the defendant’s promise to plead 
guilty, which guarantees the prosecutor a conviction without the expense of 
a trial.”
163
 While this sounds like a mutually beneficial bargain, most 
observers describe it as a coercive practice that produces involuntary pleas 
and, at times, to crimes that the defendant did not commit.
164
 This system 
creates two problems: first, prosecutors hope to efficiently obtain their 
preferred sentence; and second, charge bargaining results in the prosecutor 
having overwhelming leverage and control over the defendant’s incentive to 
plead guilty.
165 
 
 
 
 
161 See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012)(… [C]riminal justice today is for 
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 
134, 143–44 (2012) (citing Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2009: “Ninety–seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety–four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); see 
also WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 130, at 32 (finding that in 
Washington State 95.5% of criminal cases were adjudicated through a guilty plea, 2.4% 
adjudicated through a jury trial, and 2.1% adjudicated through bench trial).   
162 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1310 
(2018).
  
163 Id. at 1311. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1312. 
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Unfortunately, no data set can concretely represent how a statute, such as 
bail jumping, affects the plea-bargaining practice as all negotiations are 
behind closed doors. However, public defenders and criminal defense 
attorneys across the country acknowledge that bail jumping is often filed or 
threatened to secure convictions.
166
 Wisconsin is one state that is 
contemplating the impacts of bail jumping charges on its residents.
167
 
Though Wisconsin has a different statutory scheme than Washington, 
analyzing its effects may be useful in contemplating how to reform the 
Washington bail jumping statute.168 One attorney in Wisconsin noted that 
“[t]here are a lot of bail jumping charges issued in order to get an easy plea 
or secure a conviction in a case where [the prosecution is] less likely to get 
it.”169 Another Wisconsin attorney notes, “prosecutors can use a felony bail 
charge as a hammer to coerce a defendant to accept a plea deal.”170 
 
The Washington bail jumping statute produces the same result. In fact, 
the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney’s 2014 Charging and 
Disposition Standards state how bail jumping is encouraged to be used as a 
plea-bargaining tool: 
 
It may be appropriate to decline to file bail jumping charges if the 
defendant enters a guilty plea to the underlying charge with an 
increased State’s sentencing recommendation. Likewise, bail jumping 
charges may be dismissed in return for a plea of guilty to the 
underlying charge if the defendant has not resisted return to this  
 
 
 
166 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1495-96; Gretchen Schuldt, Felony bail jumping — common and 
unevenly applied, WIS. JUST. INITIATIVE (last visited Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wjiinc.org/blog/felony-bail-jumping-common-and-unevenly-applied 
[https://perma.cc/4Z6V-WTH4]; See also Amy Johnson, The Use of Wisconsin’s Bail Jumping 
Statute: A Legal and Quantitative Analysis, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 619, 654–55 (2018).
 
 
167 See Johnson, supra note 166, at 655. 
168 See WIS. STAT. § 946.49 (2018), Johnson, supra note 166, at 654-55. 
169 Id. (citing Plea Bargaining from the Criminal Lawyer’s Perspective: Plea Bargaining in 
Wisconsin, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 357, 363 (2007)).
 
170 Schuldt, supra note 166. 
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jurisdiction and no major costs have been incurred to obtain the 
defendant’s return.171 
 
In the fall of 2019, the Washington Defender Association (WDA) sent 
out a survey to its membership, the public, and contract defenders across the 
state of Washington, to get a glimpse of how bail jumping is being used 
particularly in plea negotiations.
172
 There were 52 responses representing 
21 out of the 39 counties in Washington State, including King, Skagit, 
Snohomish, Clark, Whatcom, and Spokane counties.
173
 Survey participants 
indicated that in cases where their clients were formally charged with bail 
jumping, the case often resulted in a plea bargain.
174
 The survey 
participants also indicated that prosecutors routinely threaten to file bail 
jumping charges and that the bail jump charge is a key charge that 
prosecutors use in plea negotiations.
175 
When asked what impact the charge bail jumping has on their clients, 
defenders indicated that the charge often prevents trials where there are good 
legal or factual reasons to go trial.
176
 They also indicated that bail jump often 
has worse sentencing consequences for their client than the underlying charge 
that initially brought them to court.
177
 Defenders say that their clients often feel 
helpless when they missed court for a good reason but are still 
 
 
171 SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF., supra note 134, at 150. 
172 WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 1; See also WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N (last  
visited Mar. 31, 2019), https://defensenet.org/ [https://perma.cc/T4Y4-6E4M].The 
Washington Defender Association (WDA) is an organization that is a “voice of the public 
defense community and provides support for zealous and high–quality legal 
representation by advocating for change, educating defenders, and collaborating with 
other justice system stakeholders and the broader community to bring about just 
solutions.” Id. The results of this survey are shared with the permission of Hillary 
Behrman, WDA’s Director of Legal Services. 
173 WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 1. 
174 Id. at 2 (When asked how bail jump cases the participants represented were resolved, survey 
participants reported that 21 percent reported a dismissal, 23 percent reported a guilty plea, 13 
percent reported a trial, and 44 percent reported plea bargain.).
 
175 Id. at 6. 
176 Id. at 7–8. 
177 Id. 
 
 
VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020 
466 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
 
facing additional prosecution.
178
 They say that the added charge often 
diminishes the client’s confidence in their attorney and the court institution 
because it is so difficult to combat the charge, and it reinforces a rigidity 
that does not account for an individual’s life circumstances.179 
 
Defenders reported in the survey that the uncontrollable circumstances 
defense is nearly impossible to combat against a bail jumping charge.
180
 For 
example, the defenders conveyed that the “uncontrollable circumstances” 
defense failed in circumstances where their client had limited means of 
transportation, including missing court due to a ferry shutdown, and where there 
were conflicts between court dates.
181
 But despite presenting evidence of these 
circumstances and barriers, defenders reported that these cases resulted in guilty 
verdicts at trial.
182
 Further, survey participants noted that their clients usually 
missed court because of issues related to indigency and rarely missed court to 
prevent the administration of justice.
183 
 
Another common theme in the survey was that clients often feel pressured to 
accept a plea agreement.
184
 Even if there is a strong case to combat the 
underlying charge, the defenders reported that clients feel pressured to take a 
plea because of how easy it is for the State to prove the elements in court.
185
 
Additionally, the participants say that their clients are often concerned about the 
number of felony convictions and their devastating effects at sentencing.
186
 
Instead of one felony or misdemeanor charge, the client will be charged and 
possibly convicted of the underlying charge as well as the 
 
178 Id. 
 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 4–6, 7–8. 
181 Id. at 4–6. 
182 Of the fifteen defenders who have represented clients charged with bail jumping, twelve reported 
a guilty verdict on the bail jump charge, one reported a resolution before the verdict, one reported a 
pending case, and one was dismissed prior to trial for prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id.
 
 
183 Id. at 4–6, 7–8. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 7–8. 
186 Id.  
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bail jumping charge.
187
 One defender noted that this is especially problematic 
for clients that are undocumented because the number of felony charges may 
impact an undocumented client’s ability to gain legal status or stay in the United 
States.
188
 Each previous felony charge counts in calculating offense scores and 
can affect present and future sentencing.
189
 As such, defenders say that clients 
feel pressured to choose between a plea agreement that promises only one 
felony conviction instead of potentially two felony convictions.
190 
 
Throughout the survey, defenders described different cases where the bail 
jumping charge was threatened or used against their clients.
191
 One client 
missed court because she had to take her sick child to the doctor.
192
 Because 
the client, herself, was not sick, she faced bail jumping charges.
193
 Another 
defender described a client who had significant challenges due to her physical 
disability which led to multiple missed court dates.
194
 Despite awareness of 
these challenges due to the client’s physical disability, the prosecutor threatened 
to charge the client with several bail jumping charges until the client felt that 
she had no other choice than to plead guilty to the underlying charge.
195
 
Defenders repeatedly reported in the survey that their clients faced 
transportation and employment issues that lead to the use and threat of bail 
jumping charges.
196
 Often, clients were faced with the choice to appear in court 
or to maintain their employment.
197
 Even though prosecutors have discretion in 
charging decisions, there is an indication that this specific charge pressures 
defendants who may want to contest their charges or are 
 
187 Id. 
 
188 Id. 
189 See WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.525 (2017). 
190 WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
191 Id. at 4-8. 
192 The Real World Impact of Criminalizing Failure to Appear, supra note 2, at 1. 
193 Id.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 See Id. at 1–2; see also WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
197 WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1, at 4-6.  
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factually innocent, increases sentencing implications, and punishes people 
for missing court under legitimate circumstances.
198 
 
3. Costs Associated with Bail Jumping 
 
Aside from the sentencing and plea implications of bail jumping, there are 
high costs associated with nonappearance and further incarceration. The Vera 
Institute of Justice, a national organization committed to criminal legal and 
prison reform, reported that in 2015, Washington State spent an average of 
$37,841 per inmate with a prison population of 16,716 people.
199
 In 2016 and 
2017, Washington State spent over $1 billion of its general funds on 
corrections.
200
 This high cost does not include any pretrial costs, such as 
increased “workloads and expenditures for the courts and law enforcement,” 
like those caused by nonappearance.
201
 In addition to the systematic costs of 
failure to appear, failure to appear imposes human and economic costs to the 
defendant, “including pre–trial incarceration and increased fines for what 
sometimes starts out a as a minor offense.”202 In addition, according to a study 
of misdemeanants in King County, Washington, defendants that fail to appear 
have, on average, twice as many hearings than those who appear in court.
203
 
Criminalizing nonappearance alone increases the costs already associated with 
the issue of failure to appear. Instead of further punishing defendants who fail to 
appear, decriminalizing nonappearance will reduce 
 
198 Id. 
 
199 Chris Mai & Ram Subramanian, The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010–
2015, VERA INSTIT. OF JUST. (2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-
state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-
spending-trends-prison-spending [https://perma.cc/5PY7-HRVA].
 
 
200 About Time: How Long and Life Sentences Fuel Mass Incarceration in Washington State, ACLU 
OF WASH. 4, 46 (2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/about-time-how-long-and-life-sentences-fuel-
mass-incarceration-washington-state [https://perma.cc/YK65-NXWC].
 
 
201  
202  
203 
 
Rosenbaum et al., supra note 37, at 177.  
Id. at 177.  
Id. at 186. 
 
 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Decriminalizing Non-Appearance 469 
 
 
costs that could be used for programs that do effectively reduce failure to 
appear rates. 
 
VI. ABOLISHING THE CHARGE OF BAIL JUMPING AND 
IMPROVING COURT APPEARANCE RATES 
 
Washington State should abolish the bail jumping statute and rely on the 
existing practices of bail and pretrial conditions reconsideration and contempt 
processes, which address pretrial misconduct. The Washington State bench and 
defense bar should also create a more robust practice regarding waivers of 
appearances in court proceedings where the defendant’s presence is not 
necessary. In addition to abolishing the bail jumping statute, Washington State 
should continue to invest, encourage, and assist counties in establishing court 
reminder systems and providing additional resources to dismantle the barriers to 
attending court proceedings. 
 
A. Abolishing Bail Jumping 
 
The Washington State legislature should repeal the bail jumping statute. 
Abolishing the bail jumping statute is the most effective way to prevent the 
coercive tactic of securing unfair plea agreements and is a step toward 
dismantling harsh sentencing penalties. Abolishing the bail jumping statute 
in no way inhibits the court from issuing a bench warrant to order the 
defendant to court, reconsidering a defendant’s bail conditions upon failure 
to appear, or using contempt proceedings for willful violations of pretrial 
conditions. Eliminating the statute does, however, protect the defendant’s 
right and wish to go to trial for the underlying offense, as well as promote 
the judge’s discretion at sentencing for the crime charged. 
 
Currently, there are three states that do not criminalize nonappearance: 
 
Maryland, Mississippi, and Wyoming.
204
 When a defendant fails to appear to  
 
204 Rebecca Pirius, Pretrial Release Violations & Bail Forfeiture, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (June 
28, 2018) http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/bail-forfeiture-procedures.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/CV2Z-B7AV].
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court, Maryland, Mississippi, and Wyoming all execute similar processes as 
Washington. The court will issue a bench warrant for a defendant’s arrest if they 
fail to appear to court—a violation of their condition of pretrial release.
205
 After 
the defendant presents before the court, the court will either revoke the 
defendant’s pretrial release or continue the defendant’s pretrial release with or 
without conditions.
206
 Maryland code expressly provides that the court must 
strike a bail forfeiture if the defendant is returned to the jurisdiction of court 
within ninety days and can show reasonable grounds for the failure to 
appear.
207
 The courts can pursue criminal contempt proceedings when a person 
obstructs the administration of justice or willfully disobeys the court’s lawful 
order.
208
 In fact, in Wyoming, failure to appear is subject to contempt sanctions 
rather than an additional criminal charge.
209
 The sanction may be imposed 
when a person on pretrial release knowingly fails to appear to court and 
provides the uncontrollable circumstances affirmative defense.210 Though the 
rule sounds similar to Washington’s bail jumping statute, it is not a statute that 
adds an additional felony or misdemeanor charge for failure to appear; and it 
goes through a separate contempt proceeding from the rest of the underlying 
charges.
211 
 
 
205 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5–213(a) (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99–5–25 (West 
2013); 3 MISS. PRAC., ENCYC. MISS. LAW § 24:26 (2nd ed.); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R.
 
3.1 (West 2018); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.  
3.2(j)(2).  
206 MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5–213(b) (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99–5–25 (West 
2013); 3 MISS. PRAC., ENCYC. MISS. LAW § 24:26 (2nd ed.); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R.
 
3.1 (West 2018); WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 46 (West 2018).  
207 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC § 5–208(b)(1) (West 2001); 2A MD. ENCYC. ARREST § 
73 (2018) (“‘Reasonable grounds’ means something less stringent than an absolutely 
compelling reason, and is not restricted to instances in which there was not a willful 
default.”); 2A MD. ENCYC. ARREST §74 (2018), Allegheny Mut. Cas. Co. v. State, 368 
A.2d 1032, 1034 (1977) (holding that the 90–day grace period for a surety to bring a 
defendant to court starts when the defendant fails to appear and the court announces 
forfeiture).  
208 MISS R. CRIM. PROC. R. 32.1(d) (2018). 
209 WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 46.4 (West 2018). 
210 Id. 
211 WYO. CRIM. PROC. R. 42 (West 2003). 
 
 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Decriminalizing Non-Appearance 471 
 
 
Washington courts could easily address the situation where a person fails 
to appear to court with the intent to obstruct the administration of justice by 
addressing the individual’s bail conditions or through contempt 
proceedings— both of which are already existing court practices in 
response to pretrial misconduct.
212
 Judges already take into account a 
person’s prior FTAs in bail considerations and revocations, regardless of 
whether the individual was previously convicted of bail jumping.
213
 In 
current practice, for example, a judge has the discretion not to punish a 
person for failure to appear by revoking their bail-bond or instating further 
pre-trial conditions if they determine that the person’s failure to appear is a 
consequence of conditions such as poverty, caregiver, or employment 
obligations.
214
 Despite the judge’s decision not to punish, the prosecution 
still has the discretion to criminally charge a defendant for missing court, 
regardless of the defendant’s reasons for missing court.
215
 Abolishing the 
statute altogether will help decrease the number of people incarcerated from 
bail jumping sentences and guilty pleas, protect defendants from the 
pressure to plead guilty, and challenge the narrative that punishment 
actually encourages court appearance. 
 
There are surely ways to reduce bail jumping’s harsh consequences 
without completely eliminating the statute. Eliminating the uncontrollable 
circumstances affirmative defense would allow broader common law 
defenses, such as necessity. For example, the Washington State Legislature 
could include the original language of “without lawful excuse” and define 
“lawful excuse” in the statutory scheme—something the Washington State 
legislature opted not to do after the Washington Supreme Court found the 
 
 
 
 
212 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 411 (3d ed. 2019). 
213 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. & PROC. § 408 (3d ed. 2019); WASH. SUPER. CT. 
CRIM. R. 3.2(c); see supra Section IV.
  
214 See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(k). 
215 See discussion supra Section V.D.2. 
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language unconstitutionally vague.
216
 This solution may allow the statute to 
apply the way it was originally intended to apply—to target those who 
intentionally fail to appear to court.
217
 A higher mens rea requirement of 
intent will also target the statute towards people who are actually 
absconding from the administration of justice and increase the State’s 
burden in proving bail jumping.218 Including specific language in the statute 
such as “intent to avoid adjudication or service of a sentence” would limit 
prosecution to those individuals who intend to abscond and obstruct justice. 
Declassifying the statute to make bail jumping a misdemeanor would 
decrease the sentencing implications for a bail jumping conviction.
219
 
Adding a provision to the statute that would prohibit the use of bail jumping 
where the underlying charge is dismissed is another way to resolve the 
unfair practices surrounding bail jumping. 
 
Despite these amendments, repealing the statute entirely is the best solution. 
Even if the statute is reformed to reduce the consequences of a bail jumping 
conviction, it does not address the major problem with bail jumping—its use to 
induce guilty pleas. Increasing the mens rea requirement from knowingly to 
intentionally may not be a viable fix for this problem. The Wisconsin statute 
provides an intentional mens rea requirement, yet it is still used as a 
prosecutorial tool to induce guilty pleas.
220
 Reforming the statute does not 
address the additional costs and implications of incarceration, as well as 
challenges with imposing legal financial obligations against who miss 
 
 
216 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.170 (1975); Hilt, 662 P.2d at 53; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
276, § 82A (1994); see also Commonwealth v. Gomez, 940 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Love, 530 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (definition of “without 
sufficient excuse” as “deliberate conduct contrary to that which was required – this in distinction 
from conduct which the actor did not will, or was unable to control.”).
 
 
217 See LEGIS. COUNCIL’S JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 13, at 329-31. 
218 See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(12) (2011), WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(a) (2009). 
 
219 Pirius, supra note 204. 
220 See WIS. STAT. § 946.49 (2018); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at 1495-96; Schuldt, supra note 
166; Johnson, supra note 166, at 654-55.
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court for wholly legitimate reasons. The bottom line is that there is already 
a recourse for failing to appear to court—failure to appear bench warrants 
and a reconsideration of a person’s bail and pretrial conditions.221 It is 
unduly punitive to further punish the defendant with either an additional 
charge or with coercing a plea agreement when the defendant was likely not 
deliberately disobeying the court. Instead of further criminalization for 
failure to appear, the state of Washington should abolish the bail jumping 
statute and focus on investing in proactive, community-based efforts that 
are shown to increase court appearance rates. 
 
B. Reducing the Burden of Mandatory Court Appearances in 
Criminal Cases 
 
In addition to abolishing the bail jumping statute, judges should 
reconsider their practice in requiring some court appearances. Superior 
Court rules state a “defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every 
stage of the trial including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the 
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence,”
222
 but in practice, defendants 
are generally required to be at every pretrial court date between arraignment 
and trial.
223
 Washington Superior Court Rule 3.4 requires, when necessary, 
a defendant’s presence at “arraignment, at every stage of the trial including 
the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and the imposition 
of the sentence” unless otherwise excused or excluded by the court with 
good cause.
224
 When the defendant is not present, but their personal 
attendance is necessary, the court may issue a bench warrant.
225 
 
 
 
 
221 See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4. 
222 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(a). 
223 WDA Bail Jump Survey, supra note 1 (Survey participants indicate that despite Rule 
3.4, judges and the State generally expect defendants to be at every court date even if the 
defendant’s presence is actually unnecessary).  
224 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(a). 
225 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(c). 
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Though judges are permitted to require the defendant to attend every 
court date, judges should consider requiring the defendant’s attendance only 
where attendance is actually necessary. Certainly, it is necessary for the 
defendant to attend their arraignment, trial, and sentencing as dictated by 
the Superior Court Rule and in adherence with the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.
226
 It may also be necessary for the defendant to attend 
certain pretrial motion hearings.
227
 However, there are many hearings that 
do not necessitate the defendant’s presence. For example, the defendant’s 
presence may not be necessary at certain pretrial hearings that have to do 
with purely legal or scheduling-related issues. A prior study on 
misdemeanants in King County found that people “who fail to appear for a 
pretrial hearing have, on average, twice as many hearings as those who 
appear.”
228
 Judges should consider the time and resources that it takes for 
many defendants to appear in court as the number of court appearances 
required places a heavy burden particularly on people who lack the 
resources and ability to attend numerous court appearances. 
 
Creating a better practice of waivers of appearances may be helpful in 
transforming the criminal court’s expectations of defendant appearance. 
Waivers of appearance allow a defendant to waive their right to appear at a 
particular court date, often done as waivers of arraignment in courts of limited 
jurisdiction.
229
 Defenders could implement a more robust practice in having 
their clients sign these waivers prior to a hearing to help alleviate the burden of 
appearance. Creating a more robust practice of waivers of appearance may 
encourage better communication between defenders and their clients. Defenders 
can also create a more robust practice of requesting telephonic or video 
conference proceedings.
230
 However, this may also create 
 
 
226 WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4; See also Allen, 397 U.S. at 338; Stincer. 482 U.S. at 
745.   
227 Id. 
228 Rosenbaum et al, supra note 201, at 186. 
229 See WASH. CT. LTD. JURISDICTION CRIM. R. 4.1(g). 
230 See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.4(d). 
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a heavier burden on public defenders with higher caseloads as it would require a 
change of practice and more follow-up with clients after they are released from 
custody. It would also require the prosecutor and the judge to consent to the 
waiver, which may not always be possible based on the specific charge and 
jurisdiction. While this is not a robust solution to the structural issues of 
requiring appearance and charging bail jumping, it is a daily practice that could 
alleviate the impacts of bail jumping and the burden of attending many court 
hearings, particularly for indigent defendants. 
 
Aside from allowing the practice of appearance by counsel with a signed 
waiver, Washington courts should consider the defendant’s individual 
circumstances before setting additional court dates, particularly pretrial 
case-setting court dates. The court system can establish trust and confidence 
with defendants and the public by providing more flexibility regarding court 
appearances. Such may also help defendants long-term in retaining 
employment, engaging in treatment programs, and meeting other 
obligations by reducing the burden of attending frequent court hearings 
where their presence is ultimately unnecessary. Recognizing the defendant’s 
life conditions and solely requiring appearance where it is absolutely 
necessary help eliminate burdens and barriers to the court. 
 
C. Investing in Proactive Efforts to Increase and Encourage 
Court Appearance 
 
There is no evidence that punishment effectively encourages court 
appearance.
231
 But there is a breadth of evidence showing that court reminder 
systems are extremely effective in reducing FTA rates, thus eliminating the risk 
of criminal punishment for bail jumping.
232
 Washington State, counties, and 
courts should continue to fund, expand, and experiment with reminder systems. 
In addition to bolstering that practice, Washington State should further its 
efforts to provide increased flexibility for defendants to appear and 
 
 
231 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1459. 
232 See infra Section VI.1. 
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alleviating the holistic and systemic reasons why people miss court. While 
these are not all legal solutions, it is important for these changes to coincide 
with abolishing the bail jumping statute in order to accomplish what the bail 
jumping statute ultimately fails to do: improve court appearance. 
 
1. Court Reminder Systems Effectively Increase Court 
Appearance Rates 
 
Courts across the country are experimenting with reminder systems, 
indicating a realization that people primarily miss court for life-related 
reasons, rather than absconding from justice.
233
 Courts utilize three main 
reminder systems: postcards, reminder phone calls, and text messaging 
systems. 
 
Postcards are a relatively common option shown to reduce failure to appear 
rates. One study in Nebraska found that postcard reminders significantly 
reduced FTA rates.
234
 There is much debate on the kind of written messages 
that are most effective in encouraging court appearance.
235
 Another study on 
Nebraska’s postcard reminder system found, for instance, that a reminder with 
more information on the possible sanctions of failing to appear is more effective 
than a simple reminder.
236
 The study indicated that reminders with harsh, 
negative messaging were the most effective message for reducing FTA rates 
across the three racial groups studied.
237
 In the Nebraska study, researchers 
found that “a reminder was most effective for defendants relatively low in 
trust.”
238
 As mentioned in Section IV of this article, people with low trust and 
confidence in the courts make up some of the demographic 
 
 
 
233 See discussion supra Section IV. 
234 Tomkins et al., supra note 19, at 105. 
235 Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 77-78. 
236 Id. at 76. 
237 Id. (“The sanctions condition reduced the FTA rate by 3.7% for Whites, 5.2% for Blacks, and 
5.8% for Hispanics; these reductions were statistically significant for Whites and Hispanics, but not 
for Blacks.”).
 
238 Id. at 77. 
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that fails to appear to court.
239
 This finding shows that written reminders 
have “the potential to equalize appearance rates for defendants who vary in 
their attitudes toward the criminal justice system.”240 The implications for 
these positive findings of written reminders include improvements of 
system efficiencies, cost-savings through better compliance, improvements 
in defendants’ perceptions of the courts, and reductions in racial and ethnic 
disparities in the criminal legal system.
241 
 
However, there are also some limitations to postcard use. One of the 
target populations facing the issue of bail jumping and high rates of failure 
to appear are indigent populations.
242
 Some of these people may be 
homeless without a reliable address to receive reminders through mail. That 
said, this consideration does not disqualify postcard reminders from being a 
part of the solution to failure to appear and bail jumping if it is implemented 
in addition to other systems. 
 
Reminder phone calls are another mechanism shown to reduce failure to 
appear rates. One program in Jefferson County, Colorado, highlights the 
effectiveness of pre-FTA and post-FTA phone calls in reducing failure to 
appear rates.243 Citing the progress in King County, Washington’s live-caller 
program results, decreasing failure to appear rates by sixty percent, Jefferson 
County opted to further test the efficacy of live-call reminder systems.
244
 The 
program also opted to test the efficacy of call-ahead reminders, to reduce failure 
to appears, and call-after reminders, to notify defendants about how to take care 
of their FTA warrant.
245
 The study found that use of call-ahead, live reminder 
calls reduced the failure to appear rate by forty-three percent, 
 
 
239 See supra Section IV. 
240 Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 77. 
241 Id. at 78. 
242 See discussion supra Section IV. 
243 Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court-appearance 
Rates and Other Benefits of Live–Caller Telephone Court–Date Reminders: The Jefferson County, 48 
J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 86, 90 (2012).
  
244 Id. at 88. 
245 Id. at 89–90. 
 
 
VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020 
478 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
 
increasing the court-appearance rate to eighty-eight percent.
246
 The live-call 
after phone calls lead to an increase of people addressing their FTA warrants 
from ten to fifteen percent.
247
 Besides the court appearance benefits, the study 
found that the live-call system enhanced the court’s customer service by 
increasing communication between the court and defendants, and helped answer 
defendants’ questions about the court and how to contact other related 
agencies.248 The calls also helped to “generally allay the fears of defendants 
who may be intimidated by the criminal justice system.”249 Employing 
programs like this may help address one reason why people miss court by 
improving a defendant’s trust and confidence in the system.250 
 
Like the limitations with the postcard system, the live-call-reminder 
system may be limited in efficacy for those who do not have access to a 
telephone—though there are programs for low-income people to access cell 
phones.
251
 In addition, lack of language options may limit live phone call 
options. Further, live caller systems are most often implemented in court 
clerks’ offices and may impede the attorney-client relationship and 
communication.
252
 Nonetheless, live-call reminder systems result in higher 
court appearance rates and is a viable option to addressing the reasons why 
people fail to appear to court. 
 
Text message reminders are another innovative solution to improve court 
appearance rates. One newly implemented text-messaging reminder service 
 
 
 
246 Id. at 89. 
247 Id. at 89–90. 
248 Id. at 92. 
249 Id. 
250 BORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 28. 
251 FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, LIFELINE SUPPORT FOR AFFORDABLE COMMC’NS (last visited Apr. 3, 
2019) https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/lifeline-support-affordable-communications 
[https://perma.cc/6QUF-CJ96].
 
252 See generally Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of Satisfaction Among Clients of a 
Public Defender Agency, 14 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 431, 443-44 (2017) (discussing literature 
indicating communication between defense attorney and client increasing trust and satisfaction in 
representation).
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is utilized in Spokane County, Washington.
253
 The new service was funded 
as a result of a $1.75 million grant through the MacArthur Foundation for 
the purpose of reducing jail populations and addressing racial and ethnic 
disparities in the criminal legal system.
254
 This resulted in a contract with 
Uptrust, a San Francisco-based company that facilitates text message-based 
communications to remind defendants about their court dates and 
mandatory appointments.
255
 One of the major benefits of Uptrust is that it 
connects with the county’s public defense system, fostering better 
communication with defendants and their counsel.
256
 To track its 
effectiveness, Uptrust collects data on failure to appear rates before and 
after implementing the system.
257
 Based on its data, Uptrust has found that 
its services have “reduced failure-to-appear rates to less than 10% in most 
counties it works with and has reduced failure-to-appear rates by 50% in 
some jurisdictions.”258 Uptrust’s services also help connect defendants with 
existing county resources—such as community oriented child care services 
and transportation.
259
 As an additional benefit to the cost-saving advantages 
of reducing bench warrants and arrests because of increased court 
appearance, there is no cost to defendants for using this system.
260 
 
The text message reminder systems face similar limitations as the live-call 
reminder system. People who are indigent may not have access to a mobile 
 
 
253 LeAnn Bjerken, New Text Service Aims to Keep Defendants Out of Jail, SPOKANE J. BUS. (Sept. 
27, 2018), https://www.spokanejournal.com/local-news/new-text-service-aims-to-keep-defendants-
out-of-jail/ [https://perma.cc/29DZ-YWBL]; Mitch Ryals, Spokane County Public Defenders to 
Begin Sending Text Reminders for Court Dates, INLANDER (Jul. 25, 2018, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.inlander.com/spokane/spokane-county-public-defenders-to-begin-sending-text-
reminders-for-court-dates/Content?oid=11081301 [https://perma.cc/9FAA-5TZQ]; UPTRUST (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2019), http://www.uptrust.co/ [https://perma.cc/X99W-4ATD].
 
 
254 Bjerken, supra note 253; Ryals, supra note 253. 
255 UPTRUST, supra note 253. 
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257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id.  
260 Id. 
 
 
VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 2 • 2020 
480 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
 
phone to receive text messages, though there are programs that help pay for 
mobile phones for low-income people.
261
 Language barriers may also be 
applicable here and is a concern that needs to be addressed in its 
implementation. The public defender-based system, while helpful in aiding 
in the attorney-client relationship, may impose a further burden on already 
busy public defender offices. But like the other proposed systems, the text 
message-based reminder system shows promising results in improving court 
appearance rates and should be further explored and invested in. 
 
Of course, there are monetary and human costs for implementing reminder 
systems. A public defense-centered system is preferred to avoid confidentiality 
and conflict of interest issues and to promote the attorney-client relationship and 
communication.
262
 A public defense-centered system collaterally promotes a 
policy interest by encouraging defendants to communicate with their 
attorneys.263 Further, a defendant’s attorney is likely the best equipped-person to 
aid their clients when a FTA is an issue. There is a cost to integrate public 
defender systems with the new technology. As a practical matter, human and 
financial costs will come from each county that implements these innovative 
systems and may be supplemented by grants.
264 
 
However, it is critical that these systems do not meaningfully impact the 
county’s public defense budget to a degree that it impacts defender’s abilities to 
provide effective assistance of counsel. Funding for public defense is already 
limited and further strapping offices in order to effectively assure 
communication and appearance would be a disservice to those in need of public 
defense services.
265
 Despite the high costs to implement technological 
 
 
261 FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, supra note 251. 
262 See Sandys & Pruss, supra note 252. 
263 Id. 
264 See WASH. REV. CODE. § 10.101.050 (2005); Bjerken, supra note 253; Ryals, supra note 253 (for 
example, Spokane County Public Defenders funded its project with Uptrust in part with a $1.75 
million grant through the MacArthur Foundation).
  
265 See generally William L. Downing, Ample Funding for Public Defenders Makes Justice  
Work for All, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017 3:22 PM) 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/ample-funding-for-public-defenders-makes- 
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solutions to help increase appearance rates, the savings of less incarceration 
and issuance of bench warrants will make up for the upfront costs. For 
example, Uptrust estimates that the cost of each failure to appear incident is 
about $1,000, considering issuing and enforcing bench warrants and pre-
trial incarceration.
266
 Defender-based text message reminder systems also 
alleviate costs affecting the attorney-client relationship by promoting 
communication, and costs affecting the defendant as failures to appear can 
impact their ability to maintain employment and their families. 
 
2. Eliminating Barriers to Accessing the Courts 
 
There are many creative, community-driven solutions to break the barriers 
that prevent people from attending their court dates. One example is Denver, 
Colorado’s Outreach Court.
267
 In response to high failure-to-appear rates, the 
City and County of Denver recognized that the homeless population faced 
barriers to attending their court appearances for reasons such as lack of bus fare, 
transportation, mental illness, or substance abuse problems.
268
 In response, 
Denver decided to bring the court to the Denver Rescue Mission to increase the 
likelihood that people who were homeless could come to court.
269
 Clinicians 
are also available to offer mental health counseling and information on drug 
treatment, and to help gain access to health care.
270
 While Denver’s Outreach 
Court is utilized for municipal cases, and not cases that would qualify for bail 
jumping as seen in Washington, it is one example 
 
 
justice-work-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/73TE-Q9LC]; see generally Derek Young, State 
Must Pay Up for Public Defenders, Pronto, NEWS TRIBUNE (Jan. 7, 2018 12:56 PM), 
https://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/article193233109.html 
[https://perma.cc/M2XU-NVZE]. 
266 Bierken, supra note 253. 
267 Tom McGhee, New Homeless Outreach Court Meets People Where They Are – at Denver Rescue 
Mission, DENVER POST (Apr. 27, 2017 11:30 AM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/01/27/homeless-outreach-court-denver-rescue-mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/42JL-2AW9].
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of an innovative way for the courts to facilitate proceedings to encourage 
appearance and dismantle barriers.
271
 A program like that in Denver may also 
help improve confidence in the courts, thus improving appearance rates. 
 
Another example of a community-driven action is providing childcare in 
or near courthouses, a solution that is now becoming more common across 
the United States. One example is the Children’s Waiting Room in San 
Francisco, which is now the standard for all new courthouses.
272
 San 
Francisco’s Children’s Waiting Rooms provides free, quality daycare for all 
who attend court.
273
 One Superior Court Commissioner noted that many 
who missed hearings in Superior Court reported that it was because no one 
was available to watch their children and they could not afford childcare.
274
 
Even though this solution is becoming more common, it should be 
expanded across all courthouses to dismantle another common barrier for 
people appearing in court. 
 
There are many other ways that Washington could invest and strategize to 
increase court appearance rates without punishment. Though the strategies can 
be costly, “these costs are insignificant in comparison to the financial and social 
costs associated with nonappearance.”275 Surely, “locally-developed, 
compassionate, and responsive to the specific needs of defendants” is a court 
system that Washington State courts can strive for through investing in such 
innovative models to address nonappearance rates.
276 
 
 
271 Id.; see also Luis A. Almodovar & Stacy Shor McNally, Are You Worried About Going to Jail? 
The Public Defender’s Office Homeless Outreach Program, 36 STETSON L. REV.
 
183 (2006) (Unlike Denver’s Outreach court, one program in Florida, that created a 
model for other programs, assists people who fail to appear for court hearings on 
misdemeanors, felonies, and violations of probation).  
272 Kathleen Guthrie, Small Spaces, Big Hearts: Visiting San Francisco Courts’ Children’s Waiting 
Rooms, SAN FRANCISCO ATTORNEY 41, 41 (2011), 
https://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q42011/childrens-waiting-room.pdf [https://perma.cc/972P-
Q3UM].
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VII. RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, 
DETERRENCE, AND EXISTING RULES 
 
There are three main arguments against this article’s call for bail jumping 
abolition, including arguments that bail jumping charges contribute to public 
safety, that bail jumping charges effectively deter FTAs, and that there are 
already existing rules preventing coercive plea bargaining. Despite these 
arguments, abolishing the bail jumping statute and investing in practices and 
structures that encourage court appearance are more just solutions. 
 
A. Public Safety 
 
Some may criticize the call to abolish the bail jumping statute as a threat 
to public safety. Critics may say that decriminalizing nonappearance will 
result in more offenders on the street with zero repercussions for missing 
court. However, the crime of bail jumping offers no effective public safety 
measure. Because bail jumping is an independent criminal charge that does 
not impact the process of bench warrants, bail or pretrial condition 
reconsideration, or contempt processes, those who miss court can still be 
arrested and brought to court in absence of a bail jumping charge. A bail 
jumping charge only occurs if the prosecutor decides to bring charges of 
bail jumping.
277
 A repeal of bail jumping does not preclude the judge from 
reconsidering the defendant’s bail or pretrial release conditions.278 For 
example, if an individual misses court and is apprehended, the judge can 
decide to impose more stringent supervision conditions, including jail.
279
 
Additionally, the judge is still going to consider the defendant’s prior 
conduct, regardless of whether the defendant was actually charged or 
convicted of prior bail jumping. Those considerations will inform the judge 
in pretrial detention and release decisions in new criminal cases. 
 
 
 
277 See discussion supra Section III. 
278 See discussion supra Section V.D. 
279 See discussion supra Section V.D.1. 
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Those most likely effected by the bail jumping charge are those with 
misdemeanors or low-level felonies, which usually do not include 
allegations of violence.280 In general, “felony defendants are less likely than 
misdemeanor defendants to have the opportunity to FTA, because they are 
often in custody.”
281
 In fact, out of the 24,257 felony sentences imposed by 
Washington courts in the 2019 fiscal year, there were only four cases that 
involved the charge “Bail Jumping with a class A felony.”282 In addition, the 
policy objectives of the statute had less to do with public safety and more to 
do with encouraging defendants to appear at their scheduled court dates.
283 
 
B. Deterrence 
 
Some critics against abolishing the bail jumping statute may say that the 
charge is actually deterring absconders and improving appearance rates. The 
reality is, however, that criminalizing nonappearance does not serve as effective 
deterrence. Studies on nonappearance have shown that nonappearance rates 
have remained stable over the last few decades even with the enforcement of 
new laws criminalizing nonappearance.
284
 Furthermore, research on the theory 
of deterrence shows a “limited disputed link between the length of sentences 
and an increased deterrent effect—on either the individual or community level” 
in part because of the inconsistency of sanctions, arbitrariness, and bias in the 
criminal legal system.
285
 Washington judges, prosecutors, and the United States 
generally need to move away from the narrative that further punitive action for 
those who miss court due to symptoms related to poverty, mental illness, 
addiction, or lack 
 
 
280 See Bornstein, supra note 31, at 78. 
281 Id.  
282 WASH. ST. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 130, at 34. 
283 See Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1061. 
284 Bernal, supra note 3, at 544 (“For example, Bryne and Stowell found that ‘there were no changes 
in... the percentage of defendants who failed to appear in court (2.3 percent vs.
  
2.2 percent)’ from 1994 to 2003, even though major legislation criminalizing nonappearance 
passed during that time.”). 
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of trust, will encourage them to attend court. The data does not support the 
belief “as research shows that sanctions alone are not a very powerful 
means to get people to obey the law.”
286
 Rather, we must be more creative 
with our tax dollars and enact policies that actually address the barriers to 
attending court. 
 
C. Rules Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness 
 
Prosecutors may argue that the use of charging or threatening to charge bail 
jumping is within their discretion and not itself coercive. Further, prosecutors 
may argue that there are already rules against prosecutorial misconduct and 
vindictiveness that curb unfair and coercive charging, and those rules are 
effectively reducing situations in which where bail jumping may be charged. 
Prosecutorial vindictiveness, prohibited by constitutional due process principles, 
happens when the State acts against a defendant in response to the defendant 
exercising their constitutional or statutory rights.
287
 But the Washington 
Supreme Court ruled that adding additional charges after failed plea 
negotiations does not constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness.
288
 The United 
States Supreme Court previously held that a defendant’s due process rights are 
not violated where a prosecutor makes explicit threats during plea negations if a 
defendant refuses to plead guilty to an original charge.
289
 The Court reasoned 
that the defendant is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer and the 
prosecution has the discretion to charge if they have probable cause to believe 
that the defendant committed the offense.
290 
 
The Washington Court of Appeals has also rejected arguments that adding 
bail jumping charges after failed plea negotiations amounts to prosecutorial 
 
 
 
286 Bornstein et al., supra note 31, at 76. 
287 State v. Korum, 141 P.3d 13, 21 (Wash. 2006) (citing U.S. v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1245 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)).
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vindictiveness.
291
 In State v. Aguilar, for instance, Mr. Aguilar was arrested for 
failing to maintain contact with his attorney during the pretrial process.
292
 After 
Mr. Aguilar was unsuccessful in negotiating a plea agreement with the State, his 
case proceeded to jury trial.
293
 The prosecution then amended the information 
to charge Mr. Aguilar with bail jumping.
294
 Since the bail jumping charge was 
supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the 
prosecution’s action was fully justified as a legitimate response to perceived 
criminal conduct. 
295
 The prosecution plainly has the discretion to leverage 
additional charges against a defendant in plea negotiations.
296 
 
Although the courts do not consider prosecutorial practices, such as what is 
occurring with the bail jumping statute in Washington State, as prosecutorial 
misconduct or vindictiveness, the bail jumping charge certainly results in the 
leveraging of plea deals, and defendants choosing to plead guilty rather than go 
to trial. Thus, the issue with bail jumping is whether, in the interest of the fair 
administration of justice, it is right and ethical to give the prosecution the tools 
to induce guilty pleas, or otherwise give them the power to charge a defendant 
with an offense that they are almost certain to win at trial, instead of proactively 
addressing the issues underlying nonappearance. The issue with bail jumping is 
whether the charge serves the policy objectives that it was enacted to 
accomplish. It clearly does not. 
 
There is further evidence that the use of bail jumping as a prosecutorial 
plea-bargaining tool is not what the statute intended. The use of the bail 
 
 
291 See State v. Aguilar, 223 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).  
292 Id.  
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id.  
296 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65 (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or 
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion…. To hold that the prosecutor’s desire to induce a guilty plea is an ‘unjustifiable standard,’ 
which, like race or religion, may play no part in his charging decision would contradict the very 
premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining itself.”).
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jumping statute is “not intended to add or diminish the punishment 
associated with the underlying offense.”
297
 Where bail jumping is utilized 
as a plea-bargaining tool, it adds an additional punishment associated to the 
underlying offense. It impacts a defendant’s decision on whether to 
continue fighting the underlying charge or to agree to a plea bargain that 
does not include the sentencing implications of the bail jumping charge. It 
makes the defendant choose between one felony charge with a possible 
successful defense or two felonies where the bail jumping charge is 
extremely likely to result in a conviction. While the use of the bail jumping 
statute may not rise to the level prosecutorial vindictiveness, it is certainly 
misused to induce pleas. The prosecution has the power to do this, but the 
practice does not effectively address the objective of meaningfully 
encouraging court appearance and the fair administration of justice, and 
thus should no longer be a prosecutorial tool. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Criminalizing nonappearance will never fulfill the promise of encouraging 
court appearance. Rather, bail jumping only serves as a prosecutorial tool to 
leverage plea agreements over those most affected by access barriers, including 
people who are indigent; people who lack access to transportation or safe, 
affordable day care; and people with mental illness, addiction, or disabilities. 
Eliminating the bail jumping statute will reduce the impact of coercive plea 
tactics and convictions for nonappearance, which largely affect people facing 
symptoms of poverty. Repealing bail jumping is also a step towards reducing 
incarceration and its associated costs. Another step in reducing costs and 
alleviating the burden on the state, courts, and people accused of crime would 
manifest in the implementation of a more robust practice by the Washington 
bench and defense bar of limiting mandatory court appearances to only those 
proceedings where a defendant’s presence is 
 
 
297 Coucil, 210 P.3d at 1061. 
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actually necessary. At the same time, greater investments in community 
resources that are shown to improve court appearance rates and trust in court 
institutions, like reminder systems, should be effectuated to accomplish what 
the bail jumping charge failed to do for the last forty years. Until we eliminate 
the barriers people face in their attempts to appear to court and recognize the 
complexities of failure to appear, we will not see improved appearance rates in 
court. In the end, we must strive for a more compassionate and, consequently, a 
more just court system that addresses the reasons why people fail to appear 
rather than punish them for simply being human. 
 
IX. 2020 UPDATE REGARDING E.S.H.B. 2231 
 
On March 18, 2020, Governor Jay Inslee signed Engrossed Substitute 
House Bill 2231—significantly reforming the charge of bail jumping to 
address some of the issues discussed in this article.
298
 While E.S.H.B. 2231 
does not abolish the charge of bail jumping as this article proposes, it has 
the potential to significantly reduce the coercive impact the charge has in 
plea bargaining situations.
299
 It gives advocates and courts reasonable, 
workable tools to address the missed court hearing without the threat of 
another criminal charge.
300
 This update addresses the various changes to 
the bail jumping statute and areas for further reform. 
First, E.S.H.B. 2231 breaks the current bail jumping statute into two 
separate charges—bail jumping and failure to appear.
301
 The State may 
charge an individual with bail jumping or failure to appear depending on the 
underlying criminal charge.
302
 Besides eligibility based on the underlying 
 
 
 
298 See E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); Gov. Jay Inslee, Bill Action, WASH. 
GOV. JAY INSLEE (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:51 PM), https://www.governor.wa.gov/ office-
governor/official-actions/bill-action [https://perma.cc/TXA9-FALK].
  
299 S. REP. E.S.H.B 2231, at 3-4 (Wash. 2020). 
300 E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
301 Id.  
302 See id. 
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crime, the statutes are quite similar in scheme.
303
 The State may charge an 
individual who has missed with “bail jump” if they are “held for, charged 
with, or convicted of a violent offense sex offense” as defined by statute, or 
fails to appear for their trial.
304
 The bail jumping charge retains the same 
felony classification scheme as discussed in this article.
305
 The State may 
charge an individual who misses court with the misdemeanor of “failure to 
appear” if they are charged with any crime not designated as a violent or sex 
offense under the statute.
306
 Both statutes state that an individual must 
receive written notice of the requirement to appear at the person’s next court 
date in order to be charged with bail jumping or failure to appear.
307
 The 
statutes change the uncontrollable circumstances affirmative defense from 
“in reckless disregard of the requirement to appear” to “by negligently 
disregarding the requirement to appear.”308 
 
The most significant reform to the bail jumping/FTA charge is the 
institution of a thirty-day window to allow for the quashing of any warrant 
issued and the rescheduling of the missed hearing.
309
 If an individual who 
misses court quashes their failure to appear warrant within thirty days, the 
State cannot charge the individual with bail jumping or FTA.
310
 This is a 
significant step forward in reducing the coercive effect and harsh sentencing 
implications of the previous statute for individuals charged with crimes 
across the state. It takes a step toward restoring the original legislative intent 
of only focusing on individuals who are absconding from justice. 
 
While this bill is an improvement to the prior construction of the bail 
jumping statute, there are still additional reforms that Washington State must 
 
303 Id. 
 
304 Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE 9.94A.030 (2019). 
305 E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); see also discussion supra Sections V.A, 
V.C.2.
 
306 E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Id.  
310 See Id.  
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consider to truly resolve the problem of the criminalization of failure to 
appear and remove the barriers preventing access to the courts. One such 
needed reform is removing the felony classification structure in the bail 
jumping statute. Individuals who would be eligible for the bail jumping 
charge are less likely to miss court than those charged with lower level 
felonies or misdemeanors.
311
 Continuing a felony charging scheme 
inherently preserves the harsh sentencing and immigration consequences for 
failure to appear.
312
 Another step towards reform of the new bail jumping 
and FTA statutes would be to remove the uncontrollable circumstances 
defense. It is unclear whether the change from reckless disregard to 
negligent disregard will change the usefulness of the affirmative defense.
313
 
In fact, it is possible that the negligence standard makes the uncontrollable 
affirmative defense more unworkable because it lowers the standard of 
analyzing whether the person’s actions contributed to the failure to 
appear.314 Eliminating the affirmative defense entirely will enable 
individuals to utilize the broader necessity defense.
315 
 
Washington State must also continue to reduce the number of required court 
appearances for justice-involved individuals across the state. Even with these 
changes to the bail jumping statute, many individuals will continue to choose 
between attending their many court appearances and going to work.
316
 WDA is 
proposing changes to court rules regarding the defendant’s presence at court 
hearings that “would allow defendants to appear through their 
 
 
 
311 See Bornstein, supra note 26, at 78. 
312 See discussion supra Sections V.C.4, V.D.1. 
313 See discussion supra Sections V.C.3, V.D.2. 
314 E.S.H.B. 2231, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(d) 
(2009) (“A person is criminal negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be 
aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such 
substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise in the same situation.”); See discussion supra Section V.C.3.
 
315 See discussion supra Section VI.A. 
316 See discussion supra Section V.D.2. 
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attorneys for some of the hearings that they are currently required to attend 
in person.”
317
 The Washington Supreme Court is considering these changes 
and are accepting comments until September 30, 2020.
318
 There are still 
many structural barriers between justice-involved individuals and accessing 
the courts, and Washington courts should continue to explore changes to 
court rules and cost-effective reminder systems.
319 
 
E.S.H.B. 2231 is an important reform for justice-involved individuals 
across Washington State—especially for low-income individuals, 
individuals with mental health or addiction disorders, and people of color. 
This bill happened in large part due to the work and research of this article, 
WDA working groups on decriminalizing FTA, and the many public 
defenders who advocated for their clients and shared their stories. There is 
hope that E.S.H.B. 2231 is just the first step towards a more just court 
system. The work continues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
317 See WASH. COURTS, Suggested Changes to CrR 3.4 and CrRLJ 3.4 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposedRuleDisplay &ruleId=4753 
[https://perma.cc/7ZMG-9JSU].
  
318 Id. 
319 See discussion supra Sections VI.B, VI.C. 
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